By David O. Brink
In Mill's revolutionary Principles David breaking point presents a scientific reconstruction and overview of John Stuart Mill's contributions to the utilitarian and liberal traditions, interpreting his first ideas and their software to problems with consultant democracy and sexual equality. verge of collapse defends novel interpretations of key parts in Mill's ethical and political philosophy, together with his options of motivation, happiness, responsibility, evidence, damage and the damage precept, freedom of expression, anti-paternalism, consultant democracy and weighted vote casting, and sexual equality. even if, the main particular element of this account of Mill's commitments is the case it makes for a perfectionist examining of his belief of happiness and the importance this has for different points of his ethical and political philosophy. in this perfectionist notion, the executive elements of happiness contain the workout of a person's capacities for functional deliberation and determination that mark us as innovative beings. as soon as this perfectionist topic is made particular, it may be proven to be vital to Mill's perspectives approximately utilitarianism, liberalism, rights, democratic govt, and sexual equality.
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Extra info for Mill's Progressive Principles
Indeed, it’s unlikely that the concept of self-interest is original equipment in infants and children. In any case, it seems quite likely that they are hard-wired to desire food and to respond to maternal care independently of any conception that these things promote their self-interest. Of course, it may well be that individuals are 2. Michael Slote discusses the possibility of a genetic version of psychological egoism in “An Empirical Basis for Psychological Egoism,” Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964): 530–37.
Methods 381] If Sidgwick is right, then Bentham is wrong to say that propinquity is a distinct dimension of a pleasure’s value. It should have no intrinsic relevance. 10 These four dimensions are supposed to bear on the value of a pleasure itself. Bentham mentions three other considerations affecting the value of pleasures, not of pleasures considered individually and intrinsically, but of some pleasures considered in relations to other pleasures (IV 3–4): 1. Fecundity, which is the tendency of a pleasure (pain) to be accompanied by more pleasures (pains).
Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General (originally 1782), ed. A. Hart (London: Athlone Press, 1970), Ch. VI, para. 19. varietie s of motivation 31 between a true but trivial thesis about the ownership of desire—an agent necessarily acts on his own desires—and a substantive but very implausible thesis about the content of desires—an agent’s ultimate desire is always and necessarily to promote his own interests or pleasure. If so, there is no thesis that is both substantive and plausible. The substantive thesis may seem speciously attractive if we tacitly confuse it with the trivially true thesis.
Mill's Progressive Principles by David O. Brink